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Different methods for allocating the joint costs of water supply projects among users are compared 
on the basis of certain commonsense principles of equity. We contrast the separable costs-remaining 
benefits (SCRB) method with simple proportional allocation schemes and more sophisticated methods 
from cooperative game theory, including the Shapley value and variants of the core. Advantages and 
disadvantages of the methods in practice are examined using a regional water supply system in 
Sweden. It is argued that these principles provide a useful framework for choosing intelligently among 
methods. The appropriateness of a method depends on the context, especially on the reliability of 
information about costs and demands. The conclusion is that there is no one best method, although 
from a normative standpoint he SCRB method may be one of the worst. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A central problem in planning the provision of goods or 
services by a public enterprise is how to determine a 'fair' or 
'just' allocation of joint costs. This problem is particularly 
acute in the development of a common water resource like a 
multipurpose reservoir, where the greater cost-effectiveness, 
of larger facilities means that the sum of the marginal costs of 
each participant may be much less than the total cost of the 
project. The literature on water resources contains a variety 
of proposals for dealing with this kind of problem, some of 
which anticipate ideas (like the core) later developed in game 
theory [Ransmeier, 1942; see also Loughlin, 1977; Heaney, 
1979; Straffin and Heaney; 1981]. 
The methods most commonly used in current water re- 
source planning practice are (1) to allocate costs in propor- 
tion to some single numerical criterion, such as use, popula- 
tion, or level of benefit, or (2) to allocate certain costs (e.g., 
marginal costs) directly, and divide the remainder on the 
basis of some scheme similar to the first method. Chief 
among the methods of the second type is the so-called 
separable costs-remaining benefits (SCRB) method, which 
is used for multipurpose reservoir projects in the United 
States [Inter-Agency Committee on Water Resources, 1958; 
Eckstein, 1958] and in other countries. This method will be 
treated in more detail in section 6. 
The same type of problem has also been extensively 
treated in the economics literature on public utility pricing. 
An approach commonly advocated there is Ramsey pricing 
[Ramsey, 1927], which is based on the idea of setting prices 
to maximize some criterion of economic efficiency, e.g., 
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consumer surplus, subject to a breakeven constraint [Bau- 
tool and Bradford, 1970]. This approach relies on having 
extensive information about the demand for the goods and 
services over a range of consumption levels--information 
that is often not available in practice, especially for a 
resource like water in which established markets may not 
even exist. Ramsey pricing is also less suitable for planning 
long-term investments, where future demand can only be 
estimated. 
A third strand in the literature comes from the theory of 
cooperative games, which provides various normative ap- 
proaches to the problem of allocating joint costs (and bene- 
fits) among users by taking the strategic possibilities into 
account. Among the most commonly used of these game 
theory concepts are the Shapley value and the nucleolus. 
The application of these ideas to water resource projects is 
increasing; for a sample of the recent literature see Loehman 
and Whinston [ 1974], Suzuki and Nakayama [1976], Bogardi 
and Szidarovsky [1976], Okada [1977], and Loehman et al. 
[1979]. Methods from the theory of cooperative games are 
particularly well suited to contexts like water resources 
development, in which the basic decision is often whether or 
not to supply a potential class of users at some targeted 
level, the implicit assumption being that this level is close to 
the optimal scale of development, The advantage isthat the 
analysis is not made to depend on precise estimations of 
future demand curves, but only on 'point' estimates of 
benefits. The disadvantage is that even such point estimates 
are often unreliable; moreover, it is implicitly assumed in the 
analysis that the optimal scale of development is known, 
which ultimately presumes that demands as well as costs are 
known. It has recently been shown that these shortcomings 
may be overcome by designing an appropriate noncoopera- 
tive game, which reveals both consumer demands and the 
optimal scale of development and at the same time allocates 
costs in a manner consistent with principles of cooperative 
equity [Young, 1980]. 
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The complexity of the cost allocation problem has led 
some authors to conclude that there is no economically 
justifiable way to allocate joint costs [see Ransmeier, 1942; 
Thomas, 1974]. Nevertheless, in practice the costs of a 
project must usually be allocated in some way among the 
beneficiaries. The purpose of this paper is to compare the 
merits of traditional methods of allocating costs with several 
well known and other lesser known methods from coopera- 
tive game theory. The analysis consists of two parts. First, 
we discuss certain established principles of 'fairness' by 
which the different methods can be judged. Second, we 
compare the solutions given by each method for an actual 
example: a cost-sharing problem among a group of munici- 
palities in Sweden who wish to develop a joint municipal 
water supply. The object of this analysis is not to provide a 
strict axiomatic characterization of methods but rather to 
explore their behavior in practice. Our conclusion is that of 
the traditional approaches, proportional allocation according 
to a single numerical criterion may be preferable to the more 
complicated SCRB method, provided that the proportionali- 
ty criterion seems fair and the accuracy of the values is not 
open to dispute. The SCRB method is shown to be seriously 
flawed in that it is not monotonic in total costs: that is, an 
increase in total costs may result in some participants having 
to pay less than before; this is due to the ad hoc way in which 
marginal costs are introduced. The game theory methods 
require more information and are more complicated; more- 
over, one of the best known of these methods, the nucleolus, 
is also not monotonic in total costs. By contrast a lesser 
known variation of the nucleolus, the proportional nucleo- 
lus, passes most of the tests of fairness considered here and 
would appear to merit serious consideration for cost alloca- 
tion in water resources development. 
2. JOINT COST FUNCTIONS 
Consider three neighboring municipalities, A, B, and C, 
who can supply themselves with municipal water either by 
building separate facilities or by building a joint water supply 
facility. We suppose that the joint facility is cheaper to 
construct than the separate projects due to economies of 
scale. The quantity of water to be supplied to each munici- 
pality is assumed given. The problem is then how to divide 
the costs among them. 
Table 1 shows the population of each municipality, the 
amounts of water to be supplied in each, and the unit costs of 
building separate facilities for each. Table 2 shows the costs 
of supplying the target amounts for different combinations. 
All possibilities are considered: A and B build a joint facility 
and C goes alone; B and C cooperate and A goes alone, and 
so on. 
The cost figures show that building a facility to serve all 
three communities will be 1.6 x 106 dollars cheaper than if 
three separate facilities were built. However, A and B 
together can also realize savings of $400,000 without includ- 
ing A. A and C, being geographically separated by B, cannot 
TABLE 1. Annual Rates of Water Use and Unit Costs of 
Supplying Water in Three Hypothetical Municipalities 
Use per Capita, Unit Cost, 
Municipality m 3 dollars/m 3 
A 140 0.46 
B 120 0.88 
C 120 1.25 
TABLE 2. Annual Costs of Water Supply Under Various 
Combinations 
Cost Breakdown, Total Cost, 
Combination dollars x 106 dollars x 106 
A + B + C 6.5 + 4.2 + 1.5 12.2 
A + {B, C• 6.5 + 5.3 11.8 
{A, B• + C 10.3 + 1.5 11.8 
{A, C•* + B 8.0 + 4.2 12.2 
{A, B, C} 10.6 10.6 
*{A, C} = A + c = 8.0. 
do any better by building a joint facility than they could by 
building separate facilities. The most cost-effective way of 
supplying water would be to build a joint facility serving all 
three communities. 
More generally, let {1, 2, ß ß ß , n} = N represent a group of 
prospective participants in a cooperative venture to provide 
a product or service to members of the group. The cost of 
serving a subgroup $, denoted by c($), is found by consider- 
ing the least cost alternative of providing the same service, 
either jointly or singly, to the members of $ independently of 
how the others are served. The joint cost function c(S) so 
defined must be subadditive, i.e., must satisfy c(S) + c(T) > 
c(S tO T) for any two nonoverlapping groups S and T, 
because the ways of serving $ together with T include the 
possibility of serving $ alone and T alone. Thus in the above 
example, municipalities A and C would find it quite costly to 
build a single joint facility because of their geographical 
separation; hence the least cost alternative would be to build 
one facility for A and another for C. 
If the cost of serving any group of users is simply the sum 
of the costs of serving them singly, then the cost allocation 
problem is trivial. The more interesting and more typical 
case arises when the cost of serving several users by some 
joint facility is less than the sum of serving them singly, that 
is, c(N) < •;NC(i). The cost savings that would result from 
cooperating in a coalition S instead of going alone are 
v(S) = 5; c(0 - c(S) -> 0 
s 
The function v is called the cost savings game. To illustrate 
the different situations that can arise, suppose that the cost 
of serving a group S depends only on the number of members 
of S and that the cost savings are greatest for larger groups 
due to economies of scale. One possibility is that the cost 
savings increase at a greater rate with each additional 
participant. Another, perhaps more typical situation is that 
the rate of increase first rises, then falls, as shown in Figure 
1. Justifying a fair allocation of costs is considerably more 
difficult in the latter case than in the former. 
3. PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: THE CORE 
'Equity' can have a wide range of meanings. When 
considering what it means for a cost allocation to be equita- 
ble, it is first helpful to ask ourselves why it should be 
equitable. The answer is, to encourage the agreement or 
cooperation of those who pay the costs. Thus a reasonable 
test of the equity of a method is to see whether the 
participants agree in principle to the proposed allocation of 
costs. 
In practice one of the most common ways of achieving 
agreement on the distribution of costs is simply to allocate 
the costs in proportion to a criterion which stands for 
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Fig. 1. Cost savings as a function of the size of coalitions. 
benefits received, such as use of facilities, number of users, 
or indeed, the benefits themselves•if they can be reliably 
estimated. Ersatz measures of benefits may actually be the 
more persuasive simply because their magnitudes are less 
open to dispute. This is the case in the municipal cost sharing 
problem discussed in section 7. Here the costs to be shared 
relate to long-term investments and future demand is conjec- 
tural at best, so the populations of the municipalities have 
been used as the basis for allocation. 
One difficulty with allocating costs in this way is that it 
may conflict with some participants' perceptions of self- 
interest and hence may not provide sufficient incentive for 
cooperation. In the municipality example above, an alloca- 
tion of costs according to populations would result in the 
shares (in millions of dollars) 7.067 for A, 2.827 for B, and 
0.707 for C. However, municipality A would find it hard to 
accept such an allocation, since it could provide the same 
amount of water on its own for only $6.5 million. An 
allocation made on the basis of use gives the shares 7.420 for 
A, 2.544 for B, 0.636 for C. A is even worse off by this 
allocation. 
The difficulty with. 'proportional' allocation methods is 
that they ignore one of the fundamentals of the problem: the 
alternative costs embodied in the joint cost function c(S). It 
is a minimum requirement of a fair allocation that it be 
individually rational: no user Should 'pay more in the joint 
venture than he would have to pay on his own. This principle 
was stated by Ransmeier [1942] for the Tennessee Valley 
Authority projects and is well established in the game theory 
literature [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944]. It is a 
fundamental concept of fairness, since it constitutes the 
minimum incentive for an individual to join. To be individ- 
ually rational, the costs y allocated to A, B, and C in the 
above example must satisfy YA --< 6.5, YB --< 4.2, y½ --< 1.5, 
where y^ + yB + Yc = $10.6 million. 
The same argument can be applied to groups of partici- 
pants as well as to individuals and indeed was so stated by 
Ransmeier [1942]. Consider, for example, neighboring mu- 
nicipalities A and B: they can build a joint facility for $10.3 
million, so it would certainly be unfair to allocate them more 
than $10.3 million in total costs. Not only would it be unfair, 
but also, if cooperation is voluntary, there is a risk of A and 
B backing out if they have an allocation YA + Y• > 10.3, 
since they can do better as a pair. The condition that no 
group pay more than its alternative cost is the principle of 
group rationality. Since a group may consist of a single 
participant, group rationality implies individual rationality. 
In the general case, where there are n independent users 
{1, 2, ß ß ß , n} = N and alternative costs are given by the 
function c(S), the condition for group rationality of a cost 
allocation y = (y•, Y2, ' ' ' , Y.), •NYi = c(N), is that 
• Yi --< c(S) V S C N (1) 
s 
A second principle with firm roots in the economics and 
project evaluation literature is that no participant should be 
charged less than the marginal cost (sometimes called the 
separable cost) of including him in the project [Federal Inter- 
Agency River Basin Committee, 1950; Inter-Agency Com- 
mittee on Water Resources, 1958; Water Resources Council, 
1962]. For example, it costs $10.6 million to serve A, B, and 
C but only $8.0' million to serve A and C. Therefore the 
marginal (or separable) cost of serving B is $10.6 - $8.0 = 
$2.6 million, so it seems only fair that B should pay at least 
this amount. This concept is called individual marginal cost 
coverage.The marginal costs for A, B, and C are $5.3,2.6, 
and 0.3 million, respectively. 
There is an obvious extension of this idea to groups. For 
example, the marginal cost of including the group {A, B• is 
$10.6 - $1.5 - $9.1 million. The principle of marginal cost 
coverage states that every group of users should be charged 
at least the additional cost of serving them. This is only fair, 
since if y^ + y• < 9.1, then C would be subsidizing A and B. 
The idea of finding prices in which users do not subsidize 
each other in the use of a given public service or facility is 
also well known in the theory of regulated public utilities 
[Faulhaber, 1975; Zajac, 1978]. 
Stated in general terms, the marginality principle is that a 
cost allocation y should satisfy 
• Yi --> c(N) - c(N - S) V S C N (2) 
s 
The argument for group rationality is based on strategic 
considerations, i.e., providing sufficient incentive to prevent 
users from withdrawing, while marginality can be viewed as 
a general concept of fairness that can be applied even if 
cooperation is mandated. However, an inspection of these 
two ideas reveals that they are in fact equivalent, given that 
all costs must be allocated, i.e., that •;NYi = c(N). 
In game theory it is customary to interpret the two 
equivalent conditions (1) and (2) in terms of the cost savings 
game v. Any allocation y of costs implies a corresponding 
imputation x of savings: if Yi is the cost assessed for i, then 
the amount i saves by cooperating rather than going alone, 
xi, is given by Yi = c(i) - xi. In terms of v, the condition of 
individual rationality says that xi => 0 for every participant i; 
group rationality says that 
E Xi •> o(S) 
S 
X = v(N 
N 
VScN 
(3) 
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The set of all vectors x satisfying (3) is called the core of the 
game v. 
In our example the core is the set of solutions to the 
following inequalities: 
x>_0 
XA + Xs --> v(A, B) = (6.5 + 4.2) - 10.3 = 0.4 
X A + X C • v(A, C) = (6.5 + 1.5) - 8.0 = 0.0 (4) 
xB + Xc >--o(B, C) = (4.2 + 1.5) - 5.3 = 0.4 
XA + XB + XC = o(A, B, C) = (6.5 + 4.2 + 1.5) - 10.3 = 1.6 
The core provides a guideline for cost allocation by narrow- 
ing down the class of acceptable imputations, but it does not 
usually identify a unique answer. However, there is always 
the unfortunate possibility that there may be no core imputa- 
tions; that is, no cost allocations that are either group 
rational or satisfy marginality. That this can happen in 
perfectly reasonable situations may be seen from Figure 1. 
Here there are increasing returns to scale, but the rate of 
increase first rises, then falls. The minimum savings that can 
be realized by all seven users together is 63, but no matter 
how these savings are distributed, some group of five will 
receive at most 45, even though they could save more (i.e., 
48) as a subcoalition. 
In such an example a quick test to see whether the core is 
empty is to draw a line from the origin to the point corre- 
sponding to the total number of users; this line segment must 
lie above the savings curve for the core to be nonempty 
[Shapley and $hubik, 1973]. In more complicated examples 
the feasibility of condition (3) can be checked using linear 
programing. In the three-municipality example the core is 
small; if the total cost c(A, B, C) had happened to be $12.0 
million instead of $10.6 million, the core would have been 
empty. Thus core imputations are not bound to exist; 
however, the greater the economies of scale, the more likely 
core imputations are to be present. Moreover, when core 
imputations exist, they are typically not unique. 
4. METHODS EXTENDING THE CORE 
One approach to resolving the twin difficulties of nonexis- 
tence and nonuniqueness has been to look for some natural 
way of strengthening (or relaxing) the inequalities defining 
the core. This is one of the most common approaches in the 
game theory literature. Three such methods will be dis- 
cussed here: the least core and its specialization, the nucleo- 
lus, and two variations: the weak least core and weak 
nucleolus, and the proportional east core and proportional 
nucleolus. 
4.1. The Least Core and Nucleolus 
If the core of the cost savings game v is empty, the best 
alternatives of some subgroups are very good---in a certain 
sense 'too' good---relative to the best alternative of the 
whole group. Hence we might consider imposing a tax on all 
proper subgroups as a way of encouraging the whole group 
to stick together. The least core is found by imposing the 
smallest uniform tax e such that if all coalitions other than 
the whole group pay this tax, then a core imputation exists. 
Thus we require the least e for which there exists an 
imputation x satisfying 
E Xi • u(S) -- E V S C N 
s (5) 
= v(N) 
N 
The least core is the set of all imputations x satisfying (5) 
for this least e [Shapley and $hubik, 1973]. The correspond- 
ing allocations of costs are found by letting yi = c(i) - xi for 
all i. Because of our assumptions about v, it can be shown 
that the result is always individually rational, i.e., that x => 0. 
Suppose on the other hand, that the cost savings game v 
already has a core, and it is necessary to find a unique 
solution. One way of narrowing down the choice is to 
imagine subsidizing all coalitions other than the whole group 
by a uniform amount e. This amounts to solving (5) for 
smallest e and allowing e to go negative. 
Computing the least core involves solving a linear pro- 
gram. For the three-municipality example, this program (in 
millions of dollars) is: 
subject to 
mine 
X A • --E X B • --E X C • --E 
X A + X B >• 0.4 - e 
XA + XC >-- --e (6) 
xs +xc>-0.4- e 
XA + XB + Xc = 1.6 
The solution is e = -0.533, XA = XB = XC = 0.533, and the 
corresponding unique cost allocation is YA = 5.967, y• -- 
3.667, and Yc = 0.967. 
In some cases the linear program (5) may have several 
solutions. If so, the following 'tie-breaking' device may be 
used. For any imputation x = (x•, x2, '--, Xn) and coalition 
S, define the excess of S to be v(S) - ZsXi. Let e•(x) be the 
largest excess of any coalition relative to x, e2(x) the second 
largest excess, e3(x) the next, and so on. The least core is the 
set X• of all x that minimize el(x). Let X2 be the set of all x in 
X• that minimize e2(x), X3 the set of all x in X2 that minimize 
e3(x), and so on. This process eventually leads to an Xk 
consisting of a single imputation •,, called the nucleolus 
[Maschler et al., 1979; Schmeidler, 1969]. 
4.2. The Weak Least Core and Weak Nucleolus 
Suppose that a minimum uniform tax is imposed on any 
individual user who takes some course of action other than 
joining the whole group. Thus we find the least e for which 
there is a solution x to the system: 
s 
(7) 
5; = v(N) 
N 
where IsI denotes the cardinality of the set S. The set of all 
corresponding imputations x is the weak least core. (For 
arbitrary e the set of all solutions to (7) has been called the 
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'weak e core' [Shapley and Shubik, 1973]; hence the desig- 
nation 'weak least core' in this case.) For the above example 
the weak least core is calculated by solving the linear 
program (in millions of dollars) 
subject to 
mine 
x^>- e xB >- e xc >- e 
x^+xB>0.4-2e 
x^ + xc > - 2e (8) 
x• +xc >0.4- 2e 
x^+x•+xc= 1.6 
The unique solution is e = -0.4, x^ = 0.4, x• = 0.8, xc = 
0.4, and the corresponding allocation of costs is y^ - 6.1, y• 
= 3.4, and Yc = 1.1. 
A choice between multiple solutions can be made as in the 
computation of the nucleolus by defining the excess of S to 
be {v(S) - sxi)/Isl. We call the result the weak nucleolus. 
This method, while superficially similar to the least core, 
tums out to have an important property not shared by the 
least core (section 8). However, it also has drawbacks' in 
particular, it may not be individually rational when the core 
is empty. While individual rationality may simply be im- 
posed as a constraint (as proposed by Grotte [1970, 1976]), 
another serious difficulty remains. The weak nucleolus may 
imply payments to dummies' partners who because of, say, 
geographical isolation, contribute nothing to the cost savings 
of any coalition. The dummy principle says that partners 
who contribute nothing to savings should go alone. The 
weak nucleolus violates this principle (a fact first noted by 
Reinhard Selten). 
4.3. The Proportional Least Core 
and Proportional Nucleolus 
Another variation on this theme is to modify the core by 
imposing a minimum tax (or subsidy) on all coalitions in 
proportion to their cost. Thus we postulate a tax rate t and 
solve the system 
subject to 
mint 
E Xi • (1 -- t)v(S) ¾S {= N 
s (9) 
X; v(N) 
N 
A minimum t exists provided that o(S) > 0 for some S • N. 
A choice between multiple solutions can be made, as in the 
computation of the nucleolus, by defining the excess of a 
coalition S to be {o(S) - 5;sXi}/o(S). (If o(S) = 0, we adopt the 
convention that a/O > b/O if a > b.) 
For the above example the linear program (9) becomes 
mint 
subject to 
x_>0 
x^ + x}• -> 0.4(1 - t) 
x^ +Xc>0 
xB +Xc-->0.4(1- t) 
XA+Xn+Xc= 1.6 
The unique solution is t = -3, x^ = 0, xn = 1.6, x½ = 0, and 
the corresponding cost allocation is y^ = 6.5, yn = 2.6, and 
y½ = 1.5. 
In other words, all of the savings in costs are allocated to 
B. The explanation for this is that B has effective veto 
power; neither A nor C can do any better than going alone 
without forming a coalition that includes B. For other 
solution concepts related to the core, see Charnes et al. 
[1978], Maschler et al. [1979], and Heaney [1979]. 
5. THE SHAPLEY VALUE 
The Shapley value for n players is given by the formula 
Yi • (S -- 1)!(n -- s)! = • [c(S) - c(S- i)] (10) 
n! 
s=l S:i•S 
This is one of the earliest methods of allocation to be 
based on a consistent set of postulates about how an 
allocation should be made [Shapley, 1953]. All players are 
assumed to 'sign up' in some particular order. If a group S 
has already signed up and i was the last member of the group 
to arrive, his marginal cost contribution to S is c(S) - c(S - 
i). The Shapley value is i's average marginal contribution if 
all orders for signing up are assumed to be equally likely. 
The Shapley values for municipalities A, B, and C are 
calculated in Table 3. The first column shows the six 
possible orders for signing up; the next three columns show 
the marginal contribution of each municipality. 
6. THE SEPARABLE COSTS-REMAINING BENEFITS 
(SCRB) METHOD 
The last method to be considered here is one commonly 
used in practice for allocating the costs of multipurpose 
water development projects. The SCRB method is based on 
the simple and appealing idea that joint costs should be 
allocated, more or less, in proportion to the willingness of 
the user to pay. The 'more or less' element is introduced 
because the proportional allocation is only performed after 
first assigning to each user his marginal (or separable) cost 
and then taking as the criterion of proportionality each user's 
willingness to pay minus the marginal cost already allocated. 
TABLE 3. The Shapley Values for Municipalities A, B, and E 
Marginal Contribution, dollars x 10 6 
Order of Signing A B C 
ABC 6.5 3.8 0.3 
ACB 6.5 2.6 1.5 
BAC 6.1 4.2 0.3 
BCA 5.3 4.2 1.1 
CAB 6.5 2.6 1.5 
CBA 5.3 3.8 1.5 
Total 36.2 21.2 6.2 
Shapley value* 6.033 3.533 1.033 
*The Shapley value is calculated by dividing the sum of the 
possible marginal contributions for each municipality (Total) by the 
number of possible orders of signing (6). 
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Specifically, let b(i) be the benefit to user i and c(i) his 
alternative cost. Evidently, i would not be willing to pay 
more than min{b(i), c(i)} (sometimes called his justifiable 
expenditure) to participate in the joint project. The marginal 
cost of including i is c'(i) = c(N) - c(N - i), which is less 
than or equal to c(i) because the cost function is subadditive. 
In the SCRB nomenclature, i's 'remaining benefit' r(i) is his 
willingness to pay minus his marginal cost: r(i) = {rain b(i), 
c(i)} - c'(i). Note that if r(/) < 0, then c'(i) > b(i) and user i 
should not be included in the project. Therefore we can 
assume that all remaining benefits r(i) are nonnegative. The 
remaining costs are c(N) - 5;•vc'(j) and are allocated in 
proportion to the remaining benefits: 
V i -- c'(i) + r(i) rj c(N) - • c'(i) (11) 
Using the marginal costs given in section 3, the remaining 
benefits (in millions of dollars) for A, B, and C are calculated 
to be 
r(A) = 6.5 - 5.3 = 1.2 
r(B) = 4.2 - 2.6 = 1.6 
r(C) = 1.5- 0.3 = 1.2 
Total = 4.0 
The nonseparable costs are 10.6 -(5.3 + 2.6 + 0.3) = 2.4, so 
the SCRB allocation (in millions of dollars) is: 
1.2 
y^ = 5.3 + • (2.4) = 6.02 
4.0 
1.6 
yB = 2.6 + • (2.4) = 3.56 
4.0 
1.2 
yc = 0.3 + • (2.4) = 1.02 
4.0 
Variations of the SCRB method include proposals for 
allocating the nonseparable costs in proportion to some 
criterion, such as use, priority of use, or population [James 
and Lee, 1971]. The difficulty with the SCRB method is that 
the simple underlying idea of allocating costs in proportion 
to benefits is lost by the ad hoc introduction of marginal 
costs; this leads to some strange results, as will be shown in 
section 8. 
7. A CASE STUDY OF SWEDEN 
The area studied consists of 18 municipalities in the Skfine 
region of southern Sweden (Figure 2). At present, most of 
the municipal water supply is drawn from three sources: 
local groundwater, and two separate pipeline systems which 
distribute water from two lakes, Vombsj6n and Ringsj6n. 
As early as the 1940's certain municipalities in the area 
realized that local water sources might not be sufficient to 
meet future demand and turned their attention to off-site 
sources. An association called the Sydvatten Company was 
formed by several of them to plan the long-term water supply 
for the region. In the late 1960's this group started to design a 
major project for obtaining water from a lake outside the 
region (Lake Bolmen) via an 80-km tunnel. 
The viability of the project depends on the number of 
additional municipalities that can be induced to participate in 
the project. This in turn depends on how much these 
municipalities will be obliged to pay for participation, bear- 
ing in mind the availability and costs of developing their own 
on-site resources. Moreover, there have been several un- 
foreseen developments since the initiation of the project 
(e.g., greatly escalated costs, more optimistic estimates of 
local resources, and lower rates of demand growth), and 
these have brought the present population-based cost alloca- 
tion procedure into question. 
The basic concepts and methods developed in the preced- 
ing sections can be illustrated by applying them to the 
Swedish case over the decade 1970-1980, since data and 
forecasts for this period are readily available. The Sydvatten 
tunnel project mentioned earlier is not expected to have any 
impact on water supply until the late 1980's, and so only 
conventional alternatives can be considered for meeting 
incremental demands over the period studied (e.g., extend- 
ing the capacity of the pipeline system and increasing the use 
of local groundwater sources where feasible). The base year 
was taken to be 1970, and a water supply system was 
designed to satisfy the municipal 'requirements' for 1980 as 
they were forecast in 1970. The different cost allocation 
methods described above were then applied to the system to 
examine the relative positions of the different municipalities. 
The results help clarify the way in which the different 
methods work, and why some of them may be preferable to 
others in practice. 
7.1. Identifying Independent Actors 
The first problem in defining the cost function is to identify 
the independent actors in the system. To develop the costs 
for each of the 2 •8 - 1 = 262,143 possible groupings of the 18 
municipalities would be impractical and unrealistic. In prac- 
tice the municipalities fall into natural groups based on past 
associations, geographical ocation, existing water transmis- 
sion systems, and hydrological and geographical features 
determining the natural routes for water transmission net- 
works. 
A careful study of these conditions led to the grouping of 
the 18 municipalities into six independent units as shown in 
Figure 2. Group H, for example, consists of those municipal- 
ities which were already connected by the Ringsj6n water 
supply system in 1970, together with the municipality of 
Sva16v, which would be located in the middle of the main 
transmission route. These groups are treated as single actors 
in the following analysis of alternative costs. Once a cost 
allocation for the groups has been determined, a further 
allocation of costs among the municipalities within each 
group could be made using a similar approach; however, this 
may not give the same result as if all municipalities were 
treated separately. The 1970 populations and forecast incre- 
mental water demands of each group are shown in Table 4. 
7.2. Ambiguities in Defining the Cost Function: 
Direct Costs 
In practice, ambiguities in defining the cost function arise 
due to the problem of direct costs, that is, costs that would 
be incurred by a given municipality no matter what course of 
action is pursued. For example, local water distribution 
systems are required within municipalities whether the water 
is supplied jointly or separately. The cost associated with 
municipal distribution systems may therefore be regarded as 
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TABLE 4. Populations and Incremental Water Demands of the 
Six Municipal Groups 
Incremental 
Population, Water Demand, 
Group x 10 3 x 10 6 m3/yr 
A 85.0 6.72 
H 176.3 8.23 
K 26.8 3.75 
L 69.0 3.53 
M 287.3 14.64 
T 59.5 6.21 
Total 703.9 43.08 
a direct cost. In principle these costs could be excluded from 
the cost function on the grounds that they can be allocated 
independently. However, in practice the borderline between 
direct and indirect costs is not always clear. In some 
municipalities, for instance, the water delivered by the 
regional supply network must first be pumped up to a 
reservoir before distribution within the municipality; the 
facilities required for pumping depend on the pressure at the 
end of the transmission network. Thus the costs of these 
distribution facilities may not be independent of the method 
by which the water is supplied. The definition of the cost 
function naturally depends on the fraction of these costs 
treated as direct costs. 
Since the definition of the cost function is always some- 
what arbitrary in practice, it is desirable to choose a cost 
allocation method that is insensitive to the inclusion of direct 
costs. One of the difficulties of the SCRB method is that in 
some cases it is sensitive to the inclusion of direct costs. 
None of the game theory methods considered here suffers 
from this drawback. 
7.3. Calculating the Cost Function 
The water supply system includes two lakes (VombsjOn 
and RingsjOn), one major groundwater aquifer (Alnarp), and 
other minor on-site sources. The possible routes of a water 
transmission network (based on a preliminary analysis) are 
shown in Figure 2. To avoid inconsistencies in defining the 
cost function, it was assumed for the purpose of this study 
that the pressure at each demand point does not depend on 
the method by which the water is transmitted to that point. 
Thus the cost of distributing the water within each munici- 
pality does not depend on the arrangement by which the 
water is supplied, so this element can be treated as a direct 
cost and excluded from the cost function. The water deliv- 
ered to each municipality was assumed to be of the same 
quality. The water was treated to bring it up to this level at 
the source, and the cost of treatment was included in the cost 
function. 
Cost functions for transmitting and treating water were 
computed using standard formulas (see Appendix A), and 
the total costs c(S) associated with the least cost combina- 
tion of alternative supply sources were estimated for each 
coalition S. The results are shown in Table $; commas 
signify that the least cost option of that coalition is to break 
up into the subcoalitions indicated. The unit costs (per 
Angelholm 
Helsi Kli 
Lain 
Sva16v 
Lorn 
Veflir 
Trelleborg 
Ringsj6n 
Group Municipalities in the group 
A •,ngelholm, H6ganSs, Klippan, •storp, Bjuv 
H Helsingborg, Landskrona, Sva16v, Es16v 
K K•vlinge, Lomma m Boundaries of ach group 
L Lund Existing water network 
M MaimS, Burl6v, Staffanstorp ----- Projected water network 
T Trelleborg, Vellinge, Svedala 
Fig. 2. The region studied in Skone, Sweden, and its divisions into groups of municipalities. 
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TABLE 5. Total Costs for Various Joint Supply Systems 
Group Total Cost Group Total Cost Group Total Cost 
A 21.95 AHK 40.74 AHKL 48.95 
H 17.08 AHL 43.22 AHKM 60.25 
K 10.91 AH, M 55.50 AHK, T 62.72 
L 15.88 AH, T 56.67 AHL, M 64.03 
M 20.81 A, K, L 48.74 AHL, T 65.20 
T 21.98 A, KM 53.40 AH, MT 74.10 
A, K, T 54.84 A, K, LM 63.96 
AH 34.69 A, LM 53.05 A, K, L, T 70.72 
A, K 32.86 A, L, T 59.81 A, K, MT 72.27 
A, L 37.83 A, MT 61.36 A, LMT 73.41 
A, M 42.76 HKL 27.26 HKL, M 48.07 
A, T 43.93 HKM 42.55 HKL, T 49.24 
HK 22.96 HK, T 44.94 HKMT 59.35 
HL 25.00 HL, M 45.81 HLMT 64.41 
H, M 37.89 HL, T 46.98 KLMT 56.61 
H, T 39.06 H, MT 56.49 AHKL, T 70.93 
K, L 26.79 K, LM 42.01 AHKLM 69.76 
KM 31.45 K, L, T 48.77 AHKMT 77.42 
K, T 32.89 K, MT 50.32 AHLMT 83.00 
LM 31.10 LMT 51.46 AKLMT 73.97 
L, T 37.86 HKLMT 66.46 
MT 39.41 
AHKLMT 83.82 
Values in Skr x 10 6. 
million m 3 yr -•) are A, 3.27; H, 2.08; K, 2.91; L, 4.50; M, 
1.42; T, 3.51. 
The cost function reveals the relative strength of the 
different actors, which depends on factors such as the cost 
and availability of local resources and access to the re- 
sources of others. For example, L finds that the unit cost of 
going alone is high; though it is located close to the major 
regional sources (RingsjOn and VombsjOn), it owns neither. 
Hence it has a strong incentive to participate in a joint 
scheme with the owners of the two sources, H and M. H and 
M have the lowest unit costs because they own the two 
systems, but they can reduce their unit costs even further by 
including other municipalities in a joint scheme, due to 
economies of scale. However, the system owned by H 
(RingsjOn) has a greater excess capacity than that owned by 
M (VombsjOn). Hence the incremental cost of other munici- 
palities joining in a coalition with M is higher than the 
incremental cost of joining with H. The effect is that H has 
more to offer its partners in a coalition than does M, and this 
will be reflected in the final cost allocation. 
8. COMPARISON OF METHODS 
Using the cost function developed above, we now com- 
pare the cost allocations of the different methods described 
in the preceding sections. We assume that all groups partici- 
pate in a joint scheme at a total cost of Skr 83.82 million (Skr 
= Swedish kronas). The results obtained from the two 
proportional allocation schemes based on demand and popu- 
lation and from the SCRB method are shown in Table 6, as 
are the Shapley value, the nucleous, the weak nucleolus, and 
the proportional nucleolus. The cost shares allocated to each 
group by the seven methods are shown in Table 7 for ease of 
comparison. Note that the 'proportional' allocations differ 
markedly from the others. A comparison of the proportional 
allocations with the costs of going alone reveals that these 
methods would charge some participants in the joint project 
more than they would have had to pay on their own. 
Allocation by demand penalizes M for participating, while 
allocation by population penalizes both H and M. 
This failure to satisfy the requirement of individual ratio- 
nality is based on the fact that proportional methods do not 
take into account crucial differences among the participants 
in their access to sources of supply. The proportional 
procedures work against H and M, which have large popula- 
tions, and favor the outlying regions A and T. The inclusion 
of A and T is relatively costly, despite their smaller popula- 
tions, because they are both remote from the major sources 
of supply. This fact is reflected in their high marginal costs 
TABLE 6. Cost Allocations of Skr 83.82 Million by Seven Methods 
Cost Allocations, Skr x 106 
Allocation Method A H K L M T Total 
Proportional to population 10.13 21.00 3.19 8.22 34.22 7.07 83.82 
Proportional to demand 13.07 16.01 7.30 6.87 28.48 12.08 83.82 
SCRB 19.54 13.28 5.62 10.90 16.66 17.82 83.82 
Shapley value 20.01 10.71 6.61 10.37 16.94 19.18 83.82 
Nucleolus 20.35 12.06 5.00 8.61 18.32 19.49 83.82 
Weak nucleolus 20.03 12.52 3.94 9.07 18.54 19.71 83.82 
Proportional nucleolus 20.36 12.46 3.52 8.67 18.82 19.99 83.82 
Individual alternative costs 21.95 17.08 10.91 15.88 20.81 21.98 108.61 
Marginal costs 17.36 9.85 0.82 6.40 12.89 14.06 61.38 
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(Table 6). Though A and T should be charged at least the 
marginal cost of including them, both proportional methods 
fail to do so. This is one serious disadvantage of the 
proportional allocation methods. 
Seemingly more reasonable than the proportional 
schemes, but actually almost as ill behaved, is the SCRB 
method. This method is individually rational only if the 
alternative costs are less than the corresponding benefits (as 
assumed in the present case); otherwise this may not be so. 
It also may not satisfy group rationality. For example, the 
three adjacent municipal groups H, K, and L can provide 
municipal water for themselves at a cost of Skr 27.26 million, 
but the SCRB method would assess them a total of Skr 29.80 
million if they all shared in a regional facility. It would not be 
in the interest of H, K, and L to participate on the basis of 
such an assessment because they are then, in effect, being 
forced to subsidize the other participants. Since there exist 
assessments in which no coalition subsidizes any other, such 
an allocation could be considered inequitable. 
That the SCRB method suffers from this defect is not 
surprising, since it considers only the marginal costs of 
including individual participants, not the marginal costs of 
coalitions. In this case the marginal cost of including both M 
and T is much higher than the sum of their individual 
marginal costs, since if one is already being served, the 
additional expense of serving the other (or individual margin- 
al cost) is low. Thus while it is not necessary to estimate all 
cost elements in order to calculate the SCRB allocation, this 
shortcut has a price' it may result in a less equitable final 
distribution. 
By contrast, a calculation of the Shapley value requires 
the alternative costs for all possible subsets. Unfortunately, 
however, this allocation also fails the group rationality and 
marginality tests. In particular, the Shapley value assesses 
the coalition HKL at Skr 430,000 more than its alternative 
cost 
Since group rationality and marginal cost coverage seem 
to be essential from the Standpoint of equity, that is, to 
provide sufficient incentives for. cooperation, the remaining 
three methods, the nucleolus, weak nucleolus, and propor- 
tional nucleolus, are potentially more desirable than those 
discussed above, as they always produce a core imputation if 
one exists. Is there any basis for preferring one method to 
another? 
A general point raised in the early study by Ransmeier 
[1942] is that a method should be able to adapt to changing 
conditions. The need for adaptability is evident in the fact 
that, typically, total project costs are not known precisely 
until after the project has been completed. Since the cost 
allocation method is usually agreed upon before the project 
has been started, it must specify how different levels of total 
costs should be allocated. Such an agreement will initially be 
based on some best estimate of the costs of alternatives, but 
once an agreement has been reached, the alternatives must 
be abandoned. It is therefore sufficient that a method specify 
how different levels of total costs should be allocated for 
fixed levels of alternative costs. 
An elementary requirement of any such method is that ff 
total costs increase then no participant will be charged less; 
conversely, if total costs decrease, no participant will be 
required to pay more. This property is called monotonicity 
[Megiddo, 1974] and is fundamental in problems of fair 
division [see, for example, Huntington, 1928; Balinski and 
Young, 1982]. 
Several of the methods considered so far do not possess 
this fundamental property. As an example, suppose that the 
total cost of the Swedish project involved an overrun of Skr 
4 million, bringing the total to Skr 87.82 million (see Table 7). 
This situation could arise if the method used for supplying 
the whole coalition involved components that would not be 
cost-effective in any smaller coalition; for example, the large 
fixed costs required for an interbasin transfer project. In fact 
a project of this nature is currently under construction in 
Sweden, and the costs are already substantially' more than 
predicted. 
Comparing the new allocations with the old (Table 6), we 
notice that the nucleolus requires K to pay less even though 
the total cost of the project has increased. Similarly, the 
SCRB method allocates K Skr 160,000 less when costs 
increase. This nonmonotonic behavior suggests that the 
nucleolus and SCRB methods may not be reasonable cost 
allocation procedures. (The nonmonotonicity of the nucleo- 
lus was first pointed out by Megiddo [1974]). 
On the other hand, it is clear that methods which allocate 
costs in proportion to some single criterion, like population 
or use, must be monotonic. This is also the case for the 
Shapley value, the weak nucle01us, and the proportional 
nucleolus. For the Shapley value and weak nucleolus, any 
change in total costs is distributed equally among the actors 
(see Appendix B). However, this partic•ular way of dividing 
changes in costs is questionable: Why should all participants 
have to share unforeseen joint expenses equally, when their 
shares in the enterprise are•very different? Perhaps a fairer 
way of measuring the participants ' hares in the enterprise i s
not by their costs (most of which they might well have 
incurred acting alone), but rather by the amounts that they 
save by virtue of taking part in the enterprise as opposed to 
going alone. A reasonable scheme would be to divide-any 
unforeseen costs in proportion to the benefits enjoyed. This 
is precisely the way in which the proportional nucleolus 
works (see Appendix B). 
9. SUMMARY 
Given the practical need to allocate the costs of a joint 
water resource facility among the different users, it is 
necessary to choose rationally among the many different 
methods ofallocation available. Using a definite computa- 
tional procedure itself provides ome semblance of rationali- 
ty. However, the justification of a method does not lie inth e 
computational procedure mployed, but in its behavior in 
practice. Thus it is necessary to compare the different 
methods on the basis of principle. 
Among the most important of these principle s are individ- 
ual rational!ty, group rationality (equivalently marginal cost 
coverage), insensitivity tO the definition of direct costs, 
monotonicity in costs, and no payments to dummies. A more 
general principle is simplicity in terms of computational nd 
informational demands. Seven different methods (including 
two proportional methods) have been selected for compari- 
son from among those discussed in the project evaluation 
and game theory literature and their performance evaluated 
by application to an actual municipal cost allocation problem 
in Sweden. The properties of the methods i.n general prob- 
lems are summarized in Table 8, which shows the principles 
violated by each. 
The game theory methods all suffer from the disadvantage 
that they are fairly complicated and require detailed informa- 
tion on costs. All of the methods except for the simplest 
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TABLE 7. Allocations With a Cost Overrun of Skr 4.0 Million 
Cost Allocations, Skr x 10 6 
Allocation Method A H K L M T Total 
Proportional to population 10.61 22.00 3.35 8.62 35.86 7.40 87.82 
Proportional to demand 13.70 16.78 7.64 7.20 29.84 12.66 87.82 SCRB 21.42 • 4.19 5.46 10.97 17.31 18.47 87.82 
Shapley value 20.67 11.38 7.29 11.03 17.60 19.84 87.82 
N ucleolus 20.76 13.25 4.51 9.80 19.16 20.33 87.82 
Weak nucleolus 20.70 13.19 4.61 9.74 19.21 20.38 87.82 
Proportional nucleolus 20.61 13.20 4.72 9.84 19.14 20.31 87.82 
proportional allocation schemes rely on information about 
demands and the optimal scale of development that in 
practice may be unreliable or nonexistent. This is particular- 
ly true for long-term investment projects such as the Swed- 
ish case discussed above. It is therefore not surprising to find 
that a simple scheme based on allocating costs in proportion 
to the population was the one actually chosen. 
APPENDIX A: COST OF WATER SUPPLY NETWORK 
This section describes the procedure used to determine 
the capital costs of pipes and pumps necessary to supply the 
required amounts of water to the demand points shown in 
Table A 1. The distances between points (in parentheses) ,and 
their elevations are shown in Figure A1. It is assumed that 
the pressure at each demand point does not depend on the 
arrangement by which the water is supplied. This allows us 
to treat each arc of the transmission network independently. 
The cost analysis of the network is therefore carded out arc 
by arc. 
The cost of water transmission includes the following 
components: 
Cost of pipelines 
C1 = ClL = ('y + od)•L Skr 
Cost of pumps 
Cost of electricity 
where 
C2-- c2 f P Skr 
C3 - c3P Skr/yr 
c• unit cost of piping, Skr/m; 
L length of pipe, m; 
c2 unit cost of pump, Skr/kW; 
f safety factor; 
c3 unit cost of electricity, Skr/kW yr; 
P effective capacity of pump, equal to (9.81/E)QH; 
kW; 
Q 
I 
E 
D 
flow of water in pipe, m3/s; 
required pumping head, equal to Ho + IL; m; 
difference in altitude between origin and destina- 
tion of pipe, m; 
hydraulic gradient; 
pumping efficiency; 
pipe diameter, m; 
coefficients. 
The total annual cost of transmission is given by 
C = (C• + C2)CRF + C3 
where 
i(1 + i) n 
CRF = = capital recovery factor (1 + i)"- 1 
i is the interest rate, and n is the amortization period in 
years. The total cost C is a function of the pipe diameter D, 
the flow Q, the pumping head H, and the length of pipe L. 
These factors are related by the Hazen-Williams formula: 
H = 10.7(Cw)-•'85D-4'87Q•'85L 
where Cw is the Hazcn-Williams coefficient. 
The economical pipe diameter D* is obtained as a function 
of the flow Q by letting OC/OD = 0: 
D* = (4.87 ab •1/(1•+4'87) Q2. 5/(1•-4.87) 
•a•CRF/ 
where 
a = (cz•CRF + c3)(9.81/E) b - 10.?(Cw) -•'85 
Similarly, the economical hydraulic gradient I* is obtained 
as 
i,--(øt•CRF)'/4'87Q(I.85,-4.87)/(B +4.87) 4.87a 
The parameters are determined from the Swedish data as 
follows' a = 477 Skr;/3 = 1.60; •/= 150 Skr; E = 0.63; Cw = 
TABLE 8. Principles Violated by Each Method 
Proportional SCRB Shapley Nucleous 
Weak 
Nucleus 
Proportional 
Nucleus 
Individual rationality X 
Group rationality X 
Direct costs X 
Monotonicity 
Dummy X 
Simplicity 
X denotes that the principle has been violated by that method. 
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TABLE A1. Incremental Water Demand for all Municipalities in the Study Area for the Period 
1970-1980 
Incremental Incremental 
Water Demand, Water Demand, Mun'icipality x 106 m3/yr Municipality x 106 m3/yr 
*ngelholm 2.65 Lund 3.53 
H6ganfis 1.48 Maim6 10.66 
Klippan 0.60 Bur16v 1.67 
•storp 0.63 Staffanstorp 2.30 
Bjuv 1.36 Trelleborg 1.26 
Vl•! •in crhnr• 4. •O Vellinge* 2.30 
Land s•cron• 1.80 R•ing* 0.57 
Sva16v 0.50 Skan6r* 0.25 
Es16v 1.32 Svedala* 1.10 
Kfivlinge 2.74 Bara* 0.73 
Lomma 1.01 
Taken from Sydvatten, Prognos 73. 
*Bara is included in the municipality of Svedala; Vellinge, Rang, and Skan6r constitute a single 
municipality. 
100; f = 1.33; CRF = 0.0871, based on i = 0.06, n = 20 
years; c 2 = 1893 Skr/kW; c3 - 613 Skr/kW yr. The results 
are D* = 0.928Q 0-43, I* -- 2.99Q -ø'28 x 103, c! = (150 + 
477Dl'6ø)L, C2 - 39.2QH x 103, and C3 = 9.54QH x 103. 
The cost of treating water at Vombsj6n includes the costs 
of filtration, pumping, and chlorination. The treatment at 
Ringsj6n consists of screening, sedimentation, coagulation, 
and filtration. Unfortunately, the particular cost data on 
these unit processes were not available, so capital costs and 
the costs of operation and maintenance (O/M) were estimat- 
ed using available data. The cost of treating on-site ground- 
water includes the costs of pumping, filtration, and chlorina- 
tion, and these were also estimated. The results of the cost 
analysis are given in Table A2, where O is the flow of water 
through the treatment plant in millions of cubic meters per 
year. 
5 
H6ganiis • Angelholm 
I 
I I 
I I (18) I (16)• i I i 
I I 's),,'e3•-tørP 
_ _ _ I-'lels,ngborg (10• (47• (10) "O Klippan 30 
•, Sva16v 
Landskrona 29 I (õ)I 67 
4 
Kfivlinge 24_•37 
(17)• • • (?)•J(S) 
,'• (4)• õ 
Bur16v 2 3) (6) q/•// R(., Staffa.sto%/ø (121 (101 Maim6 9.•_,•. '1 19"• r ,m, ,m, Vombsj6n 
% Svedala 48 
Vellinge•13 Pipelines existing in1970 
R {5)% 1" * .... New pipelines 
•ing 1 '-•l• •ø 
Skan6r 2•(-- 7)" •"'"•ff"" (9) "•(4) 
Trelleborg 5 '• 
Fig. A1. The water transmission network. The number at each node represents the elevation i  
meters' the number in parentheses on each arc represents the distance in kilometers. 
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TABLE A2. The Cost of Providing Water From the Three 
Sources 
Water Source Cost Value Unit, x 10 a 
, 
Vombsjon Capital Cs: v -- 2.31 0 ø'74 Skr 
RingsjOn 
Groundwater 
O/M C• v = 0.162 O ø'9• Skr/yr 
Capital Cff = 3.68 0 0'64 Skr 
O/M C• = 0.410 0 0'64 Skr/yr 
Capital C•c 2.38 0 0'58 Skr 
O/M CM c = 0.263 0 0'82 Skr/yr 
APPENDIX B: MONOTONICITY 
The weak least core is the set of optimal solutions to the 
linear program 
mine 
subject to 
• x• = v(N) 
N 
s 
which is equivalent to 
min • (xi + e) 
N 
subject to 
Z Xi = 
N 
5; (x• + •) >_ v(S) 
s 
This is equivalent to solving 
min Z x i' 
subject to 
¾ScN 
¾SCN 
• x/>- v(S) 
s 
¾ScN 
(12) 
and letting X i -- X i' -- E, where e = {•;•v X? -- v(N)}/n. Since 
the x' program is independent of v(N), an increase in v(N) 
simply has the effect of increasing eraand hence every 
component x•by the same amount. The same holds for the 
weak nucleolus; hence the weak nucleolus is monotonic. 
The proof of monotonicity of the Shapley value is left to the 
reader. 
The proportional east core is the set of optimal solutions 
to the linear program 
mint 
subject to 
• x• = v(N) 
N 
• xi>-(1 - t)v(S) ¾SCN 
s 
where we assume that v(S) > 0 for some $ • N to ensure 
existence. This is equivalent to solving (12) and letting xi = 
xi'v(N)/•vx[. An increase in v(N) by a common proportion 
simply has the effect of increasing every component of xi by 
the same proportion. The same holds for the proportional 
nucleolus; hence it is monotonic. 
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